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Saturday, November 04, 2006

"Desert Crossing" 1999 Assumed 400,000 Troops and Still a Mess

----- Original Message -----
From: "National Security Archive"
To:
Sent: Saturday, November 04, 2006 11:13 AM
Subject: Post-Saddam Iraq: The War Game


National Security Archive Update, November 4, 2006

POST-SADDAM IRAQ: THE WAR GAME

"Desert Crossing" 1999 Assumed 400,000 Troops and Still a Mess

http://www.nsarchive.org

For more information contact:
John Prados - 301/565-0564 or Roger Strother - 202/994-7000

Washington, DC, November 4, 2006 - A series of war games held in 1999
specifically to anticipate problems following an invasion of Iraq assumed a
deployment of 400,000 troops to maintain order, seal borders and provide for
other security needs. But the games, known as Desert Crossing, were
apparently ignored by the Defense Department. When CENTCOM commander Gen.
Anthony Zinni, after his retirement, advised planners to refer back to
Desert Crossing as they prepared for the 2003 invasion, the response
reportedly was, "Never heard of it."

Now, seven years later, documentation on preparations for the games and
detailed After Action records have surfaced in response to a Freedom of
Information Act request by the National Security Archive, which is posting
the materials on its Web site today.

"The conventional wisdom is the U.S. mistake in Iraq was not enough troops,"
commented National Security Archive director Thomas Blanton, "but the Desert
Crossing war game in 1999 suggests we would have ended up with a failed
state even with 400,000 troops on the ground."

Desert Crossing, which amounted to a feasibility study for part of the main
war plan for Iraq -- OPLAN 1003-98 -- tested "worst case" and "most likely"
scenarios of a post-war, post-Saddam, Iraq. The After Action Report
presented its recommendations for further planning regarding regime change
in Iraq. The results drew some pessimistic conclusions regarding the
immediate possible outcomes of an invasion. A number of these mirror the
events which actually occurred after Saddam was overthrown.

* "When the crisis occurs, policy makers will have to deal with a large
number of critical issues nearly simultaneously, including demonstrating
U.S. leadership and resolve, managing Iraq's neighbors, and rapid policy
formulation."

* "A change in regimes does not guarantee stability. A number of factors
including aggressive neighbors, fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic
lines, and chaos created by rival forces bidding for power could adversely
affect regional stability."

* "Iran's anti-Americanism could be enflamed by a U.S.-led intervention in
Iraq. ... The influx of U.S. and other western forces into Iraq would
exacerbate worries in Tehran ... More than any other country in the region,
the principals were most concerned by how Iran would respond to a U.S.-led
intervention in Iraq."

* "Iraqi exile opposition weaknesses are significant ... The debate on
post-Saddam Iraq [during the war game] also reveals the paucity of
information about the potential and capabilities of the external Iraqi
opposition groups ... [T]here was no dispute that if the United States were
to support them, much must be done in order for these groups to be
politically credible within Iraq."

These documents were posted today on the Web site of the National Security
Archive:

http://www.nsarchive.org

________________________________________________________

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institute and library located at The George Washington University in
Washington, D.C. The Archive collects and publishes declassified documents
acquired through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). A tax-exempt public
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